This article explores issues surrounding the legitimacy of private sector provision in 6 criminal justice. It examines changes in ideas about legitimate coercion which have made
expected to develop their own systems of policing -in close co-operation with state 28 authorities -for the particular populations with which they are concerned. 29 30
Such outsourcing does not of course directly challenge the state's ultimate monopoly of 31 legitimate coercion because the latter retains the role of outsourcing agent, inspector and 32 custodian of the legal frameworks governing private sector subcontracting. Nevertheless as 33 day to day coercion and constraint are exercised by employees of private security companies 34 -locking inmates or suspects in cells, handing out fixed penalty notices and requiring name 35 and address, sanctioning offenders on probation licence for breaches etc. -quite profound 36 issues of the legitimacy of such constraint are raised. 37 38
Even if the legitimacy of such coercion is increasingly unquestioned -by public and media -39 this was not always the case and changes over a relatively short historical period need to be 40
understood. An outline of the dynamics of such change is the purpose of this article. Office (SFO) (Travis 2013a (Travis , 2013b . Both companies sustained reputational damage leading 390 to the resignation of senior management and this was a factor in the decision by two English 391 police forces not to proceed with proposed multi-million pound contracts for outsourcing 392 back office work (White 2014 (Travis 2016) . This led to the suspension and arrest of G4S staff for violent behaviour but, 433 despite an inquiry which "highlighted initial concerns about the efficacy of monitoring 434 arrangements and about whether G4S staff had sufficient understanding and training in 435 relation to the safeguarding of children in their care" (Holden et al. 2016: 8) , no attempt has 436 been made (to date) to go beyond prosecution of the employees involved. This focus leaves 437 the company itself some breathing space to demonstrate its continued commitment to high 438 standards and willingness to collaborate with the authorities against criminality by its 439 employees. Although the company has suffered considerable reputational damage and 440 adverse publicity it continues to receive major government contracts. For example in July 441 2016 it was reported that the contract for the running of the Equality Advisory and Support 442
Service helpline (supervised by Government Equalities Office) was to be awarded to G4S 443 despite the fact that a House of Lords committee had in March recommended that the service 444 be taken in-house (White 2016 The aim is to establish a type of legitimacy which "reflects a pro-social logic that differs 489 fundamentally from narrow self-interest" (Suchman 1995: 579) 
503
Normative legitimacy strategies attempt to deflect particular failures which would otherwise 504 compromise pragmatic legitimacy by stressing the basic values of the corporation -including 505 the steps taken to 'correct mistakes' when these are exposed. The aim, then, is to establish the 506 overall legitimacy of the corporation as the sort of entity to which government contracts 507 (including criminal justice) can be safely awarded despite the fact that things may 508 'occasionally go wrong'. Normative legitimacy has to be consciously propagated -through 509 various media and advertising campaigns -because: 510 511 in contrast to the unconscious internalization of cognitive and institutional logics that is Human Rights. Health and Safety establishes that the "safety and wellbeing of our employees 532 and those in our care is one of our key priorities. Our goal is zero harm" (G4S 2015: 25). 533
534
Regarding Human Rights the report recognises that "we have a duty to ensure that we are not 535 at risk of violating human rights through the services we provide, the customers we work 536 with, the suppliers we use, or through the unfair or inappropriate treatment of our own 537 employees and others who are in our care" (G4S 2015: 25). As regards criminal justice 538 outsourcing this orientation is embodied in the undertaking that G4S "will only offer custody 539
and detention services where we can maintain a qualified talent pool and where the political, 540 legal, human rights standards and regulatory framework is consistent with our group values 541 and results in acceptable operational, commercial and reputational risk" (G4S 2015: 5). 542 543 This is good to hear but the question obviously arises of periodic departures from these 544 aspirations, many of which reach the national media through the work of investigative 545 journalists and organised global campaigns such as StopG4S. In this respect the global sphere 546 of operations by the company creates resources which may be deployed by critics and 547 campaigners to counter its normative legitimacy. We have already noted that the company 548 has continued to secure UK government contracts despite major failures. There seem to be 549 two elements of the response to failure. The first is to simply withdraw from a particular area 550 of outsourcing which has become problematic. For smaller security companies such a move 551 may rapidly undermine financial viability but for large transnationals like G4S, providing, as 552
we have seen, a wide variety of services, such a move may be seen as simply a step on the 553 road to rationalising the spectrum of services provided by withdrawing from those which 554 produce reputational damage for the company and focusing on less problematic forms of 555 outsourcing. Though there are obvious limits to such a strategy if the company is not to 556 forego profitable opportunities, it does seem to have been the response to the Medway 557 incident and indeed other adverse publicity globally as evidenced by the reported intention of 558 the company to withdraw from provision of penal facilities in Israel (Reed and Plimmer 559 2016). 560 561
The second part of the response, which goes to the heart of the normative legitimacy strategy, 562 is the attempt to emulate the type of response to failure characteristic of state agencies. This 563 involves a familiar mantra of admitting mistakes but claiming that lessons have been learned 564 and new procedures put in place to prevent repetition. In extreme cases there will be an 565 independent investigation. In cases of major failure by criminal justice agencies, senior police 566 officers, chief probation officers or prison governors -even on rare occasions judges -may 567 be forced to resign (Fitzgibbon 2011 
